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1 Introduction 
Formal semantics of natural language is the study of the meaning of natural lan-
guage expressions using the tools of formal or symbolic logic. The ultimate aim 
of the discipline is commonly taken to include the following: to give an explica-
tion of the concept of meaning and to use this explication to provide an account 
of the role of language in the activity of drawing inferences ( the individual pro-
cessing of information), and of the role of language in the activity of sharing or 
communicating information (the collective processing of information). 
This article provides an introduction to formal theories of meaning and to 
logical analysis of language in the footsteps of Gottlob Frege, the founding fa-
ther of the enterprise. The process of composition of meaning and the relations 
between the concepts of meaning, inference and truth are presented, and con-
textual aspects of meaning are discussed. The article ends with a sketch of the 
emerging perspective of a dynamic theory of meaning. 
2 The Composition of Meaning 
Introductory logic textbooks usually include a selection of exercises for translat-
ing natural language sentences into first order logic. Invariably, these exercises 
assume that the student already has a firm grasp of what the sentences mean. 
The aim of such exercises is to expand the student's awareness of the expressive 
power of predicate logic by inviting him or her to express an (intuitively) well-
understood message in the new medium. Because of this presupposed under-
standing of the original message, such translations cannot count as explications 
of the concept of meaning for natural language. 
We should ask ourselves under what conditions a translation procedure from 
natural language into some kind of logical representation language can count as 
an explication of the concept of meaning. Obviously, the procedure should not 
presuppose knowledge of the meaning of complete natural language sentences, 
but rather should specify how sentence meanings are derived from the mean-
ings of smaller building blocks. Thus, the meanings of complex expressions are 
Report CS-R9055 
Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science 1 
P.O. Box 4079, 1009 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
derivable in a systematic fashion from the meanings of the smallest building 
blocks occurring in those expressions. The meaning of these smallest building 
blocks is taken as given . It has been argued that the real mystery of semantics 
lies in the way human beings grasp the meaning of single words; see for example 
Percy (1954), or Plato's dialogue Cratylus. 
Formal semantics has little or nothing to say about the interpretation of 
semantic atoms. It has rather a lot to say, however, about the process of com-
posing complex meanings out of smaller building blocks . The intuition that 
this is always possible can be stated somewhat more precisely; it is called the 
Principle of Compositionality: 
The meaning of an expression is a function of the meanings of its 
immediate syntactic components plus their syntactic mode of com-
position. 
The principle of compositionality is implicit in Gottlob Frege's writings on phi-
losophy of language; it is made fully explicit in Richard Montague's approach 
to natural language semantics. Rather than indulge in philosophical reflections 
on the meaning of compositionality, we will illustrate the principle by showing 
how Alfred Tarski 's definition of the semantics of first order predicate logic (see 
the article FIRST ORDER LOGIC) complies with it. 
From the end of the nineteenth century until the nineteen sixties the main 
tool of semantics has been the language of first order predicate logic, so called 
because it is a tool for describing properties of objects of the first order in 
Bertrand Russell's hierarchy of things, properties of things, properties of prop-
erties of things, etcetera. Essentially, predicate logic was first presented in 1879 
by Frege. 
Modern semantic theories of natural language a.re generally not based on first 
order logic but on typed intensional logic, because of its still larger scope and 
because of the fact that this tool is more suited for a compositional treatment 
of the semantics of natural language. Typed logics and intensionality will be 
discussed further on in this article . 
3 Meaning in Predicate Logic 
According to Frege, the key concept of semantics is reference in the real world. 
For sentences, this boils down to truth simpliciter. Proper names are assumed 
to refer to individuals in the real world bearing those names, common nouns 
to sets of things in the real world having the appropriate properties, and so 
on. Because in this view any name names only one object, a sharp distinction 
between name a.nd object is not crucial. At the start of the development of 
predicate logic , no sharp distinction was ma.de between syntax a.nd semantics. 
Later on, there gradually emerged a. clearer distinction between the syntax 
and the semantics of formal representation languages. The semantics of sen-
tences of first order logic is then given in terms of classes of models (see the 
article MODEL) in which the sentences are true . The validity of inferences in 
first order logic, from a set of premisses to a conclusion, is in turn described in 
terms of truth: the valid inferences are precisely those with the property that 
any model in which all the premisses are true makes the conclusion true as well. 
This ha.bit of generalizing over models is a. typical feature of formal semantics. 
The generalisation reflects the fact that validity of inferences concerns the form 
of the inferences, not their content. It should be borne in mind, though, that this 
concept of form is arrived at by generalizing over content. As far as semantics is 
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concerned with interpretation of language in appropriate models the discipline 
is concerned with (semantic) content as opposed to (syntactic) form . 
The first clear discussion of the discipline of semantics conceived as the study 
of the relations between the expressions of a logical language and the objects 
that are denoted by these expressions is due to Tarski (1933). (See Tarski (1956) 
for an English translation .) This section gives the gist of the matter. 
The non-logical vocabulary of a predicate logical language L consists of a 
set C = {co, c1, c2, .. . } of names or individual constants, for each n > 0 a set 
pn = {Pt, Pi, P2, . .. } of n-place predicate constants, and for each n > 0 a set 
fn = {f0 , Ji, J2, ... } of n-place function constants. Note that not all of these 
ingredients have to be present: in most cases, most of the pn and fn will be 
empty. A typical value for the highest n with either pn or fn non-empty is 3, 
which is to say that predicate or function constants with higher arity than 3 
are quite rare . The arity of a predicate or function constant is its number of 
argument places . 
The logical vocabulary of a predicate logical language L consists of paren-
theses, the connectives,, /\, V, ---> and ..-t, the quantifiers V and :3, the identity 
relation symbol = and an infinitely enumerable set V of individual variables. 
If the non-logical vocabulary is given, the language is defined in two stages. 
The set of terms of L is the smallest set for which the following holds: 
• If t E V or t E C, then t is a term of L. 
• If f E fn and ti, . .. , tn are terms of L, then f ( t1 · · · tn) is a term of L. 
This definition says that terms are either individual variables or constants, or 
results of writing n terms in parentheses after an n-place function constant. 
Terms are the ingredients of formulae. The set of formulae of L is the smallest 
set such that the following holds: 
• If t 1 , t 2 are terms of L, then t 1 = t 2 is a formula of L . 
• If PE pn and t1 , . .. , tn are terms of L, then Pt1 • • • tn is a formula of L. 
• If cp is a formula of L, then ,cp is a formula of L . 
• If cp, '1/) are formulae of L, then ( cp I\ 7P), ( cp V 7P), ( cp --+ 7P) and ( cp ..-t 7P) are 
formulae of L. 
• If cp is a formula of Land v EV, then \/vcp and :lvcp are formulae of L. 
This completes the definition of the syntax. The semantic account starts with 
the definition of models . A model M for L is a pair (D,J) where D is a non-
empty set and J is a function that does the following: 
• I maps every c E C to a member of D. 
• For every n > 0, I maps each member of pn to an n-pla.ce relation R on 
D . 
• For every n > 0, I maps each member of fn to an n-place operation g on 
D. 
Dis called the domain of the model M, I is called its interpretation function. 
Sentences involving quantification generally do not have sentences as parts 
but open formulae, i.e . formulae in which at least one variable has a free oc-
currence. As it is impossible to define truth for open formulae without making 
a decision about the interpretation of the free variables occurring in them, one 
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employs infinite assignments of values to the variables of L, that is to say func-
tions with domain V and range ~ D. However, it is easy to see that only the 
finite parts of the assignments that provide values for the free variables in a 
given formula are relevant . 
The assignment function s enables us to define a value function for the terms 
of L. Let the model M = (D, I) be fixed and let s be an assignment for Lin 
D. The function v. mapping the terms of L to elements of D is given by the 
following clauses: 
• If t EC, then v,(t) = I(t). 
• If t EV, then v,(t) = s(t) . 
• If t has the form f(t1 · · · tn), for some f E fn, then 
v.(t) = I(f)(v .,(t1), . .. , v.(tn)). 
Note that the clause for function terms is recursive, and moreover, it precisely 
follows the recursion in the syntactic definition of such terms. 
We continue to follow the syntactic definition in the semantics. The second 
stage of the semantic definition process consists of explaining what it means for 
an arbitrary formula t.p of L to be true in the model relative to an assignment 
s. We recursively define a function [-]. mapping the formulae of L to the set 
of truth values {0, 1} (0 for falsity, 1 for truth). The recursive definition follows 
the syntactic definition of the formulae of the language. First the basic case is 
handled where <p is an atomic formula. 
1. If <p has the form t1 = t2 , then 
[cp]. = 1 if and only if v.(t1) = 1J.(t2). 
2. If <p has the form Pt1 · · · tn, then 
[t.p]. = ] if and only if (v.(ti), . .. , v.(tn)) E I(P). 
The logical connectives are treated as follows: 
3. If <p has the form ,1/;, then [cp]. = 1 if and only if [1/;]. = 0. 
4. If <p has the form (1/; /\ x), then 
[cp]. = 1 if and only if [1/;]. = [x]. = l. 
If <p has the form ( 1/; V x), then 
[cp]. = l if and only if [1,b]s = 1 or [x]s = l. 
If <p has the form (1/;--+ x), then 
[cp]. = 0 if and only if [1/;]. = 1 and [x] .• = 0. 
If <p has the form ( 1/; ...-. x), then 
[cp]. = 1 if and only if[1/;]. = [x] •. 
Finally, we consider the case of the quantifiers V and 3 . To start with a simple 
example, suppose we want to describe the circumstances under which 'vxPx is 
true. In the description we want to refer to information about the truth or 
falsity of Px, for we want the account to be compositional. Saying that Px 
must be true in the model, given s, is not enough, because [Px]. depends on 
the value that s assigns to x: [Px]s = 1 if and only if s(x) E I(P). What we 
want to say is something different: Px is true no matter which individual is 
assigned to x. This means that we are interested in assignments that are like 
s except for the fact that they may assign a different value to some variable v. 
Here is a precise definition: 
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s(vjd)(w) = { ;(w) ifw =p V 
ifw =v. 
Armed with this new piece of notation we dispose of the quantifier case: 
5. If <p has the form Vv'lj;, then 
[<p] 8 = 1 if and only if [1P]s(vld) = 1 for every d EM. 
If <p has the form ?Jv'lj;, then 
[<p] 8 = 1 if and only if ['lj;].(vld) = 1 for at least one d EM. 
This completes the definition of the function [-].. If [<p]. = 1 we say that 
assignment s satisfies <p in the model, or that <p is true in the model under 
assignment s. 
As was remarked above, truth or falsity of a formula in a model under an 
assignment s only depend on the finite part of s that assigns values to the free 
variables of the formula. Sentences do not contain free variables, so the truth of 
falsity of a sentence in a model does not depend on the assignment at all. We 
say that a sentence <p of L is true in a model if <p is true in the model under 
every assignments. Equivalently, we could have said that <pis true in the model 
if <p is true under some assignment. The notion of an assignment was a tool 
that can now be discarded. 
The main feature of the Tarski semantics for predicate logic is its recursive 
nature: the meaning of a complex formula is recursively defined in terms of the 
meanings of its components. This is what compositionality is all about. 
4 Abstraction and Quantification 
In the above presentation of the semantics of first order predicate logic, quan-
tifiers were introduced syncategorematically, which is to say that they are not 
regarded as building blocks of the language in their own right. It follows that 
the quantifiers do not have meanings of their own. The compositional semantics 
of first order predicate logic would look more elegant if the quantifiers were to 
be considered building blocks. This can be done by means of the concept of 
abstraction. 
Abstraction as a conceptual tool is already used by Frege, but his notation 
is rather awkward . Rather than stick with Frege's presentation we present a 
version using lambda operators or ..\-operators (see the article LAMBDA OP-
ERATOR). Lambda operators were introduced by Alonzo Church (1940). We 
will show how this device can be used to construct meanings for separate build-
ing blocks of languages. In doing so we sketch a version of typed logic (see the 
article TYPED LOGICS). Typed logics are currently the most widely used tools 
for representing the semantics of natural language expressions. 
The fact that in example (1) John can be replaced by Fred to form a new 
sentence shows that we can abstract from John. 
( 1) John repects Bill. 
This process of abstraction starts with a sentence, removes a proper name, and 
yields a function from proper names to sentences, or semantically, a function 
from individuals to truth values, i.e. a characteristic function (see the article 
CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION). Lambda operators allow us to refer to this 
function explicitly. 
(2) ..\x.x respects Bill. 
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The function denoted by (2) corresponds to the property of respecting Bill. For 
convenience we call functions of this type properties . Next, we can abstract 
from the second proper name, and we get a functional expression denoting the 
relation of respecting. 
(3) >.y>.x.x respects y . 
Expression (3) denotes the relation of respecting by presenting it as a function 
that combines with an individual to form a property (a function from individuals 
to truth values). Actual variable names are unimportant but binding patterns 
matter: (3) and (4) are (logically equivalent) alphabetic variants. 
(4) >.x>.y.y respects x. 
The relation of being respected is denoted by a slightly different lambda expres-
sion (5). 
(5) >.x>.y.x respects y . 
The distinction between the active and passive voice is reflected in the different 
binding patterns of (4) and (5) . 
In the context of lambda operators, quantifiers can be viewed as higher order 
functions . The quantifier V combines with the expression >.x.cp, where cp is a 
sentence, to form a sentence V>.x.cp (which we will continue to write as Vxcp). 
Observe that the quantifier itself does not have to act as a binder any more. 
The binding mechanism is taken over by the lambda operator. The sentence 
\/xcp is true if and only if >.x .cp denotes a function which gives true for every 
argument. Thus, V denotes a function from characteristic functions to truth 
values. It maps every characteristic function that always gives true to true, and 
every other characteristic function to false. Similarly, :3 denotes the function 
from characteristic functions to truth values which maps every function that for 
some value assumes the value true, to true, and the function that assigns false 
to every argument, to false. 
Lambda abstraction and quantifiers put one in the fortunate position of 
being able to express what it means to admire an attractive girl (6) . 
(6) >.x.3y(girl y I\ attractive y I\ x admires y). 
To be courted by every unmarried man, on the other hand, is something quite 
different, as expression (7) makes clear. 
(7) >.x.\/y((man y I\ - married y)-+ y courts x). 
It is also possible to abstract over objects of more complex types. Again start-
ing from (1), one can abstract over the transitive verb or over the predicate. 
Abstracting over the predicate yields (8), an expression which combines with a 
property denoting expression (i .e., a predicate) to form a sentence. 
(8) >.P.P(john) . 
Interestingly, (8) is an expression of the same type as that of quantified noun 
phrases. The quantified noun phrase every man combines with a property de-
noting expression to form a sentence, so (9) is an appropriate translation. 
(9) >.P.Vx(man x-+ P(x)). 
Combining (9) with (2) gives the expression in (10). In fact, for convenience 
we have replaced (2) with an alphabetic variant (an expression using different 
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variables to effect the same binding pattern). This kind of conversion is called 
a convers10n. 
(10) >.P.Vx(man x--+ P(x))(>.y.y respects Bil0. 
Expression (10) is the result of combining the translation of every man with that 
of respects Bill. The result should be a sentential expression, i.e. an expression 
denoting a truth value. To see that this is indeed the case, a reduction of the 
expression is necessary. All expressions of the form >.v.E(A) are reducible to a 
simpler form; they are called redexes (reducible expressions). 
5 Reducing Lambda Expressions 
To reduce expression (10) from the previous section to its simplest form, two 
steps of so-called /3 conversion are needed. During /3 conversion of an expression 
consisting of a functor expression >.v.E followed by an argument expression A, 
basically the following happens (we will state a proviso shortly). The prefix >.v. 
is removed, the argument expression A is removed, and finally the argument ex-
pression A is substituted in E for all free occurrences of v. The free occurrences 
of v in E are precisely the occurrences which were bound by >.v in >.v.E. 
Here is the proviso. In some cases, the substitution process described above 
cannot be applied without further ado, because it will result in unintended 
capturing of variables within the argument expression A. Consider expression 
(11) . 
(11) (>.x>.y.R(y)(x))(y) . 
In this expression, y is bound in the functional part >.x>.y.R(y)(x) but free in 
the argument party. Reducing (11) by /3 conversion would result in >.y.R(y)(y), 
with capture of the argument y at the place where it is substituted for x. The 
problem is sidestepped if (J conversion is performed on an alphabetic variant of 
the original expression, say on (>.x>.z.R(z)(x))(y) . 
Another example where a conversion (i.e., switching to an alphabetic vari-
ant) is necessary before (J conversion to prevent unintended capture of free 
variables is the expression (12). 
(12) >.p.Vx(A(x) = p)(B(x)). 
In (12), pis a variable of type truth value, and x one of type individual entity. 
Then xis bound in the functional part >.p.Vx(A(x) = p) but free in the argument 
part B(x). Substituting B(x) for pin the function expression would cause x to 
be captured, with failure to preserve the original meaning. Again, the problem is 
sidestepped if (J conversion is performed on an alphabetic variant of the original 
expression, say on >.p.Vz.(A(z) = p)(B(x)). The result of /3 conversion then is 
Vz .(A(z) = B(x)), with the argument of B still free, as it should be. 
Using [A/v] for the substitution operation we can express the /3-reduction 
step formally as follows. Suppose >.v.E(A) is an expression where all bound 
variables are different from the free variables. This condition constitutes a 
straightforward way of making sure that the problem mentioned above will not 
occur. Then >.v.E(A) /3-reduces to [A/v]E. 
Applying the procedure of (J reduction to (10), we see that a first (J conversion 
step reduces (10) to (13), and a second, internal, /3 conversion step then yields 
(14) . 
(13) Vx(man x--+ >.y.y respects Bill(x)) . 
(14) Vx(man x--+ x respects Bill). 
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The process of reducing lambda expressions has drastic consequences for their 
syntactic appearance. Historically, the syntactic form of logical expressions 
translating natural language sentences was taken to reflect the logical form of 
these sentences. In the next section it is pointed out that the metamorphosis of 
/3 conversion bears on certain historical problems of logical form . 
6 Misleading Form and Logical Form 
From John walked it follows that someone walked, but from No-one walked it 
does not follow that someone walked. Therefore, logicians such as Frege, Russell, 
Tarski and Quine have maintained that the structure of these two sentences 
must differ, and that it is not enough to say that they are both compositions of 
a subject and a predicate. 
The logicians who used first order predicate logic to analyse the logical struc-
ture of natural language were struck by the fact that the logical translations of 
natural language sentences with quantified expressions did not seem to follow 
the linguistic structure. In the logical translations, the quantified expressions 
seemed to have disappeared. The logical translation of (15) does not reveal a 
constituent corresponding to the quantified subject noun phrase. 
(15) Every unmarried man courted Mary. 
(16) 'v'x((man x /1. -married x) - x courted mary). 
In the translation (16) the constituent ever1.J unmarried man has disappeared: 
it is contextually eliminated . Frege remarks that a quantified expression like 
every unmarried man does not give rise to a concept by itself ( eine selbstandige 
Vorstellung), but can only be interpreted in the context of the translation of 
the whole sentence. Applied to this particular example: the literal paraphrase 
of (16) is: 
(17) All objects in the domain of discourse have the property of either 
not being unmarried men or being objects who courted Mary. 
In restatement (17) of sentence (15) the phrase every unmarried man does not 
occur any more. 
The logical properties of sentences involving quantified expressions (and de-
scriptions, analyzed in terms of quantifiers) suggested indeed that the way a 
simple noun phrase such as a proper name combines with a predicate is log-
ically different from the way in which a quantified noun phrase or a definite 
description combines with a predicate. This led to the belief that the linguistic 
form of natural language expressions was misleading. 
The application of the logical tools of abstraction and reduction allow us 
to see that this conclusion was unwarranted. Using translation of natural lan-
guage in expressions of typed logic we see that natural language constituents 
correspond to typed expressions that combine with one another as functions 
and arguments. After full reduction of the results, quantified expressions and 
other constituents may have been contextually eliminated, but this elimination 
is a result of the reduction process, not of the supposed misleading form of the 
original natural language sentence. Thus we see that, while fully reduced logical 
translations of natural language sentences may be misleading in some sense, the 
fully unreduced original expressions are not. 
As an example of the way in which the >. tools smooth logical appearances, 
consider the logic of the combination of subjects and predicates . In the simplest 
cases (John walked) one could say that the predicate takes the subject as an 
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argument, but this does not work for quantified subjects (no-one walked). All 
is well, however, when we say that the subject always takes the predicate as 
its argument, and make this work for simple subjects by logically raising their 
status from argument to function . Using >., this is easy enough: we translate 
John not as the constant j, but as the expression >.P.P(j). This expression 
denotes a function from properties to truth values, so it can take a predicate 
translation as its argument. The translation of no-one is of the same type: 
>.P. - 3x .(person x I\ P(x)) . Before reduction, the translations of John walks 
and no-one walks look very similar. These similarities disappear only after both 
translations have been reduced to their simplest forms. 
7 Meaning in Natural Language 
In a Montague style approach to natural language, one takes for the natural 
language syntax some version of categorial grammar enriched with quantifying 
in rules (to be discussed at the end of this section), and for the semantics some 
form of typed logic. The combination of categorial grammar and typed logic 
allows the link between syntax and semantics to be of the utmost simplicity. 
Lexical items get assigned categories such as CN for common nouns, IV for 
intransitive verbs, S/IV for noun phrases (these take intransitive verb phrases 
on their right to form sentences), (S/IV)/CN for determiners (these take com-
mon nouns on their right to form noun phrases), IV\IV for adverbial modifiers 
(these take intransitive verb phrases on their left to make new intransitive verb 
phrases). See the article CATEGORIAL GRAMMAR for further details. 
Next, the lexical· items get assigned translations with types matching the 
syntactic categories. In the simplest possible approach, the translation types 
are defined in terms of simplest types e (for entities) and t (for truth values) . 
Formulae have type t, individual terms have type e. Expressions denoting func-
tions from type A to type B have type (A, B). It follows from this rule that 
property denoting expressions have type ( e, t) . In general, if variable v has type 
A and expression E has type B, then >.v .E has type (A, B) . If E has type 
(A, B) and a has type A, then the expression E(a) is well-formed and has type 
B . 
It is not difficult to see which types are suitable for which syntactic cat-
egories. Sentences, category S, should translate into formulae, with type t. 
Intransitive verbs, category IV, translate into properties, type (e, t). Common 
nouns, category CN, also translate into properties. The rest of the category-to-
type match is taken care of by a general rule. If category X translates into type 
A, and category Y translates into type B, then categories X/Y (takes a Y to 
the right to form an X) and Y\X (takes a Y to the left to form an X) translate 
into type (A,B) . 
The rules for syntactic function application are then matched by rules for se-
mantic function application. The meaning of John loves Mary is derived in two 
steps. First loves and Mary, with categories IV /(S/IV) and S/N respectively, 
combine to form loves Mary, with category IV. The meaning of this expression 
is derived from the meanings of the components by function- argument applica-
tion . Next John and loves Mary, with categories S/IV and IV respectively, are 
combined to form John loves Mary, with category S. Again, the meaning is de-
rived from the meanings of the components by function-argument application. 
Further details on how quantifiers and determiners are interpreted in this setup 
are provided, respectively, in the articles QUANTIFIERS and DETERMINERS. 
Let us now briefly examine the notion of ambiguity for fragments of natural 
language with a compositional semantics. If a natural language expression E 
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is ambiguous, i.e. if E has several distinct meanings, then, under the assump-
tion that these meanings are arrived at in a compositional way, there are three 
possible sources for the ambiguity (combinations are possible, of course): 
l. The ambiguity is lexical: E contains a word with several distinct meanings. 
Example: a splendid ball. 
2. The ambiguity is structural: E can be assigned several distinct syntactic 
structures. Example: old (men and women/ versus (old men/ and women. 
3. The ambiguity is derivational: the syntactic structure that E exhibits can 
be derived in more than one way. Example: Every prince sang some 
ballad. is not structurally ambiguous, but in order to account for the 
:JV reading one might want to assume that one of the ways in which the 
structure can be derived is by combining some ballad with the incomplete 
expression every prince sang -. 
Derivational ambiguities are very much a logician's ploy. In an essay on philo-
sophical logic by P.T. Geach they are introduced as follows: 
( ... ) when we pass from "Kate / is loved by / Tom" to "Some girl / is 
loved by / every boy", it does make a big difference whether we first 
replace "Kate" by "some girl" (so as to get the predicable "Some 
girl is loved by - " into the proposition) and then replace "Tom" by 
"every boy", or rather first replace "Tom" by "every boy" (so as to 
get the predicable "- is loved by every boy" into the proposition) 
and then replace "Kate" by "some girl". Two propositions that 
are reached from the same starting point by the same set of logical 
procedures (e.g. substitutions) may nevertheless differ in import 
because these procedures are taken to occur in a different order. 
(Geach 1962, section 64.) 
This is exactly the mechanism that has been proposed by Richard Montague 
to account for operator scope ambiguities in natural language. Montague intro-
duces a rule for quantifying in of noun phrases in incomplete syntactic struc-
tures. The wide scope :3 reading for the example Every prince sang some ballad 
is derived by using a rule Qi to quantify in some ballad for syntactic index i in 
the structure Every prince sang PROi. In more complex cases, where more than 
one occurrence of PROi is present, the appropriate occurrence is replaced by the 
noun phrase, and the other occurrences are replaced by pronouns or reflexives 
with the right syntactic agreement features . See Montague (1973) for details. 
The Montagovian approach to scope ambiguities does not account for restric-
tions on possible scope readings . It is not denied that such restrictions should 
be imposed, but they are relegated to constraints imposed by lexical features 
of determiner words. A problem here is that scope behaviour of certain natural 
language expressions seems to be influenced by the wider syntactic context. See 
the article SCOPE AMBIGUITIES for information . 
8 Meaning, Truth and Inference 
Typed logics are the proper logical tool for describing the semantics of natural 
language. One way to go about generalizing the model concept of predicate 
logic for languages of typed logic is as follows. A model for a typed logic based 
on individual objects and truth values starts out with a universe U for the 
domain of individual objects, and the set {1, O} for the domain of truth values. 
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Next, more complex domains are construed in terms of those basic domains. 
The domain of properties is the set of functions U -> {1, O}, i.e. the set of all 
functions with U as domain and the truth values as co-domain. The domain of 
characteristic functions on properties ( the type of things to which the quantifiers 
V, 3 belong) is the set (U-> {1, O})-> {1 , O}, and so on. Another generalization 
is also possible, by defining so-called general models: see the article on TYPED 
LOGICS for details. 
Models for typed logical languages can be used to define functions [·] which 
map all expressions of the language to objects of the right types in the model: 
sentence type expressions to truth values, property type expressions to proper-
ties, object-to-property type expressions to functions from objects to properties , 
and so on. Let us assume for a moment that the basic domain U is the set of nat-
ural numbers, and that the predicate letter O stands for being an odd number. 
Then the interpretation of a property expression Ax.0(x), notation [Ax.0(x)], 
is a function f which yields 1 for every u E U which is an odd number, and 0 
for all even numbers . The property expression AX. - 0( x) has the characteristic 
function of all even numbers as its interpretation. The interpretation of AP.VP 
(universal quantification over individuals), notation [AP.VP], is the function 
F E (U -> {1, O}) -> {1, O} with F(f) = 1 for the function f in U -> {1, O} 
with f(u) = 1 for all u E U, and F(g) = 0 for all g # f . As a final example, 
AP.'vx.(-0(x) -> P(x)) has as its interpretation the characteristic function F 
which maps every function f E U -> {1, O} mapping every even number to 1, to 
1, and all other functions in U-> {I, O} to 0. Note that AP.Vx.(-0(x)-> P(x)) 
would be an appropriate translation for the natural language phrase every non-
odd thing. 
The model theoretic approach to meaning now equates the intuitive concept 
of meaning with the precise model theoretic concept of interpretation, i.e. with 
values of a function [·] generated by an appropriate model. Note that [·] is 
ultimately defined in terms of the interpretations of certain basic expressions in 
the model (for instance, predicates like 0, universal quantification over individ-
uals). The interpretation of these basic expressions can be described in terms 
of truth in the model, modulo appropriate assignments to free variables. The 
meaning of O reduces to the truth or falsity of 0(x) in the model, relative to 
assignments of individuals to x, the meaning of universal quantification over in-
dividuals reduces to truth or falsity of'vx.<p in the model, relative to assignments 
of properties to AX.<p, and so on. Thus we can say that meaning is ultimately 
defined in terms of truth in a model. 
Next, logical validity of inferences is defined in terms of truth, by saying 
that an inference from premisses <p1 through ((Jn to conclusion 1/J is valid if and 
only if every model in which all of <p1 through ((Jn evaluate to true will make 
1/J true as well. In fact, for typed languages , the concept of logical validity can 
be extended to arbitrary expressions denoting characteristic functions. Let E 1 
and E2 be expressions for characteristic functions of the same type. Let us say 
that one characteristic function F1 involves another one, F2, if F1 and F2 have 
the same types and F2 yields 1 for every argument for which Fi yields 1. Then 
E1 logically involves E2 if and only if in every model, [E1] involves [E2]. To 
give a rather trivial example, Ax. - 0(x) logically involves Ax.(0(x) V -0(x)) . 
Typed languages are powerful enough to express involvement in a formula. E 1 
logically involves E2 if and only if the formula VP.(E1 (P) = E 2 (P)) is true in 
every model. Here P is a variable of the right type for arguments of E 1 and E 2 . 
Conversely, one may want to impose certain restrictions on the possible 
interpretations of the basic vocabulary by stipulating that certain concepts 
should involve others. For instance, one may want to ensure that the con-
cept of walking involves the concept of moving relative to something. Assuming 
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that we have expressions >.x.W(x) for walking and >.y>.x .M(x, y) for moving 
with respect to, we can express the requirement as: >.x.W(x) should involve 
>.x.3y.(object(y) /\ M(x,y)). The semantic requirement is then imposed by re-
stricting attention to models in which the first concept does indeed involve the 
second one. The desired involvements can be expressed as formulae. Such for-
mulae, intented to constrain the class of possible models with the purpose of 
enforcing certain relations between elements in the vocabulary of the language, 
are called meaning postulates. Given a natural language fragment and a set of 
meaning postulates for that fragment, a sentence of the fragment is analytic if 
it is true in any model satisfying all the meaning postulates. A sentence of the 
fragment is synthetic if it does have counterexamples among the models satisfy-
ing all the meaning postulates. Given that the meaning postulates constrain the 
meanings of the vocabulary in the right way, we may assume that the real world 
(or some suitable aspect of it) will make all the meaning postulates true, so the 
synthetic sentences are precisely those that the world could be in disagreement 
with. The logically valid sentences are those that are true in any model of the 
language, irrespective of any meaning postulates. 
This overview of models, interpretations, logical inference, logical involve-
ment, and the analytic/synthetic distinction makes clear that truth is the tor-
toise which carries the whole edifice of semantics on its back. See the article 
TRUTH AND PARADOX for further discussion of this key concept. 
9 Meaning in Context 
The very simple account of meaning given in the previous sections breaks down if 
one wants to extend the treatment to intensional phenomena. Consider example 
(18). 
(18) John seeks a girlfriend. 
Example (18) might mean that John is looking for Sue, who happens to be 
his girlfriend, but it might also mean that John is answering small ads in the 
lonely hearts column because he wants to create a situation in which he has a 
girlfriend . 
The setup of the previous sections would only give us the first sense of the 
sentence. A standard way to get the second sense is by making a distinction 
between extensional and intensional interpretations of phrases. The extensional 
interpretation of a phrase is its interpretation in a given context. The inten-
sional interpretation is somewhat more involved: it is a function from contexts 
to (extensional) interpretations in those contexts. Under the second reading of 
(18), John is related, not to an individual, but to the set of possible contexts 
which contain a girlfriend for him. Such possible contexts are often called pos-
sible worlds; see the article POSSIBLE WORLDS. So how do we characterize a 
context which contains a girlfriend? Following Lewis (1970), we call the set of 
all properties of a thing the character of the thing. Some reflection will show 
that expression (19) denotes the characteristic function of the character of a 
girlfriend : 
(19) >.P.3y(girlfriend(y) /\ P(y)). 
Expression (19) gives the character of a girlfriend in the actual context, but that 
is not quite what we want . To achieve what we want we must interpret basic 
expressions such as common nouns relative to contexts, with girlfriend(y, c) 
meaning that y is a girlfriend in context c. Expression (20) gives a mapping 
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from contexts to characters of girlfriends in these contexts. 
(20) >.c>.P.3y(girlfriend(y, c) /\ P(y, c)). 
When John is seeking a girlfriend in the intensional sense he is related to the 
item specified by (20). 
Intensional interpretations are also useful for interpreting propositional at-
titude sentences, such as the example in (21). 
(21) John believes that a ghost is haunting his house. 
The embedded that-clause in this example cannot have its extensional inter-
pretation, for if in fact no ghost is haunting John's house (let us assume for 
convenience that ghosts do not exist), then the extensional interpretation is 
just the truth value false, and John's beliefs are not as closely tied to the ac-
tual world as that. Rather, (21) is true just in case any situation or context 
compatible with John's belief is such that in that context a ghost is haunting 
his house. The translation for the embedded clause that we need to get this is 
given in (22). 
(22) >.c.3y(ghost(y, c) /\ haunt(y, house-of (john, c), c) ). 
Note that the common noun translations and the translation of the transitive 
verb haunt all have an extra argument for the context. The translation of the 
proper name does not, for we take it that proper names denote the same indi-
vidual in any context. One way to tackle Frege's famous Morning Star/Evening 
Star paradox in terms of intensions would be to make names context-sensitive 
too We will not spell out details, as such a solution is not without its philosoph-
ical difficulties. The source of the paradox is not so much change of reference of 
proper names in other contexts, but incomplete information about the identity 
relation in those contexts (see the article IDENTITY). 
It should be noted that the shift from extensional to intensional interpre-
tations by no means solves all problems of sense and reference (see the article 
SENSE AND REFERENCE). Intensions are still not fine-grained enough to 
distinguish between equivalent statements of logic. Because logical truths are 
true independent of context, 2 + 2 = 4 is true in all contexts, and so is Zorn's 
lemma is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice. Still, John knows that 2 + 2 equals 
4 hardly warrants the conclusion John knows that Zorn's lemma is equivalent 
to the Axiom of Choice. John may never have heard about set theory in the 
first place. One possible way out is to make meanings still more fine-grained, 
by taking them to be structured trees with intensions at their leaves. See Lewis 
(1970) for details . Indeed, Lewis reserves the term meaning for such structured 
objects. 
Now that we have mentioned contexts, we might as well acknowledge the fact 
that the context in which a natural language statement is made--let us call it the 
current context-plays a very special role in the interpretation of the sentence. 
Tense operators are interpreted with respect to the time of utterance, personal 
pronouns I, you, are interpreted as speaker and addressee in the current context, 
demonstratives can be used to anchor the discourse to items in the current 
context. The anchoring mechanism has to be defined with some care, for it 
should be able to account for the anchoring of sentences like This is cheaper 
than this, but this is nicer than this (with four acts of pointing to different 
objects while the sentence is being uttered). Again, see Lewis (1970) for some 
suggestions. 
In the above we have more or less equated contexts with possible worlds, 
i.e. alternative complete pictures of what the world might have been like. It 
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is argued in Barwise (1981) that some contexts of linguistic utterance are es-
sentially incomplete. This observation has led to the development of strategies 
for interpreting natural language with respect to partial models or situations. 
See the article SITUATION SEMANTICS for a full-fledged theory along these 
lines, and Muskens (1989) for an attempt to incorporate partiality in a more 
traditional account. 
10 The Meanings of Non-Indicative Expressions 
We have seen that the extensional interpretation of a declarative sentence is a 
truth value, and its intensional interpretation a set of contexts. The extensional 
interpretation of John loves Mary in a model is either the value true or the 
value false. The intensional interpretation of this sentence is the set of contexts 
where the sentence has the value true. The intensional interpretation is needed 
in cases where the sentence occurs in embedded contexts, such as Bill believes 
that John loves Mary, which is standardly interpreted as true just in case John 
loves Mary is true in any context which is compatible with everything that 
Bill believes. So much for the semantics of the indicative mood. How about 
such non-indicative moods as questions and commands? Can their semantics 
be related to the semantics of the indicative mood? 
Broadly speaking, the indicative mood is for describing situations, the in-
terrogative mood for checking situations, and the imperative mood for (giving 
directions for) changing situations. A declarative sentence picks out a set of con-
texts where the sentence is true; its (intensional) meaning has the form >..i.Pi, 
where Pis a predicate of contexts. Now take simple yes/no questions, for exam-
ple. A yes/no question such as Does John love Mary? is an invitation to check 
whether the indicative root of the question, namely the statement John loves 
Mary, is true in the situation we are in. A check is an action, and actions are 
transformations from situations to other situations. Thus, a yes/no question 
P? denotes a relation >..i>..j.(i = j I\ Pj). In other words, a yes/no question 
relates the set of states of the world to the set of states where the answer to 
the question is yes. This dynamic view of questions can be related to a more 
static picture. See Hintikka (1976) or Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984, 1988) for 
the static semantics of questions, Van Benthem (1990) for relations between a 
static and a dynamic view. 
Utterances in imperative mood can be interpreted as commands to change 
the context, i.e. as mappings from contexts to intended contexts which are 
the result if the command is obeyed. Again, a dynamic perspective naturally 
presents itself. The command Close the door! relates situations to new situa-
tions where the door is closed. A command P! denotes a relation >..i>..j.Pj. In 
other words, a command relates the set of states of the world to the set of states 
of the world where the command is fulfilled. Of course, there is much to be said 
about felicity conditions of imperatives ( Close the door! only makes sense when 
the door is open), but likewise there is much to be said about felicity condi-
tions of questions and declaratives. See the article PRAGMATICS for further 
illumination. 
What matters here is that a command like Close the door! can be interpreted 
as a relation between the current context c0 and the set of all contexts which are 
the result of performing the action of closing the door in co in some way or other. 
The result of uttering the command need not be that one ends up in a context 
like co but with a closed door (not all commands are obeyed, fortunately), 
but that does not matter to the principle of the account. Note that, just as 
in the dynamic account of questions, the concept of truth continues to play 
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an important role. The contexts that are like the current context but where 
the command has been obeyed are contexts where the sentence which is the 
declarative root of the imperative is true. 
11 The Dynamics of Meaning 
In the previous section we have started to look at meaning in a dynamic way. 
Instead of focussing on the question 'How are linguistic expressions semantically 
linked to a (static) world or model?' we have switched to a new question: 'How 
do linguistic messages viewed as actions change the current situation?' Not 
only a question or a command, but every linguistic utterance can be viewed as 
an action: it has an effect on the state of mind of an addressee, so one could 
say that the dynamic meaning of a natural language utterance is a map from 
states of mind to states of mind. Such talk about influencing states of mind is 
no more than a metaphor, of course; to make this precise one needs to replace 
'state of mind' by a more precise concept of state. An obvious place to look for 
inspiration is the semantics of programming languages, where the meaning of a 
program is taken to be the effect that it has on the memory state of a machine: 
the dynamic meaning of a computer program is a mapping from memory states 
to memory states. Van Benthem (1990) looks at the link between programming 
language semantics and natural language semantics in some detail and presents 
a uniform picture of how static and dynamic views of language are related. 
In imperative programming, e.g. in a language like Pascal, on program 
startup part of the storage space of the computer is divided up in segments 
with appropriate names. These are the names of the so-called global variables 
of a program, but in order to avoid confusion with logical variables we will call 
these store names. The effect of a program can be specified as a relation between 
the states of the stores before the execution of the program and the states of the 
stores afterward. A memory state is a specification of the contents of all stores, 
in other words, it is a function from the set of stores to appropriate values for 
the contents of these stores. Equivalently, we can look at each individual store 
as a function from states to appropriate values for that store. In this perspective 
on stores as functions from states to values, we can say things like v1 (i) = 3, 
meaning that the content of store v1 in state i is 3. 
Suppose a program consists of one cor;,mand, v1 := 3, the command to 
put the value 3 in the store with name v1 . Then the effect of this program 
on a given state i is a new state j which is just like i except for the fact that 
v1(j) = 3 (where the value for v1 in i might have been different). We will use 
the abbreviation i[v]j for 'state i and state j differ at most in the value store v 
assigns to them'. We will assume that if i is a state and v a store, then there 
will always exist a state j with i[v]j. 
In a language like Pascal every store has a specific type: some stores are 
reserved for storing strings, others for integer numbers, others for real numbers, 
and so on. For a rough sketch of how to use the dynamics metaphor for an 
account of anaphoric linking in natural language, these storage types do not 
matter. We will assume all stores to be of the same type: we take it that they 
are all used to store (names of) entities. We can again use typed logic as a 
medium of translation, but now we need an extra basic type s. For ease of 
exposition, we forget about contexts and intensionality again, and go back to 
an extensional treatment. Using s for the type of states and e for the type of 
entities, we can express our assumption that all stores store entities as follows: 
every store is of type ( s, e). 
Suppose we have a list of store names V = v1, v2, .... We want to account for 
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anaphoric links as in example (23). The intended anaphoric links are indicated 
by subscripts. 
(23) A 1 man loves £v.i woman. He1 kisses her2. 
The difficulty with the traditional account of the semantics of (23), where the 
anaphoric links are established by a variable binding mechanism, is that the 
pronouns in the second sentence can only be translated as variables bound by 
the existential quantifiers in the first sentence if the quantifiers extend their 
scopes beyond the sentence limit. The scope of an existential quantifier has to 
be closed off somewhere, but there appears to be no natural place for a boundary. 
Wherever one puts the closing-off point, beyond it pronouns might still turn up 
that have to be linked to the same antecedent. Some theories have tried to solve 
this problem by translating indefinite and definite noun phrases as some sort 
of free variables (see the article DISCOURSE REPRESENTATION THEORY). 
We will sketch now how a dynamic approach to pronoun-antecedent linking can 
be integrated in a traditional Montague style grammar. 
In the dynamic approach, sentences are translated as relations between 
states, in other words, sentences are of type (s, (s, t)): a sentence interpreta-
tion takes two states and then gives a truth value . Sentences that do not have a 
dynamic effect will not change the state, for instance the 'dynamic' translation 
of John loves Mary, in typed logic, will be something like (24). 
(24) >.i>.j.(i = j I\ love(john, mary)). 
The translation of A1 man loves £v.i woman, on the other hand, does involve 
state changes, because the dynamic interpretation of the indefinite noun phrases 
involves assigning values to stores. The interpretation of a1 man is a relation 
between states i and j which holds just in case i(v1]j and the value of v1 in state 
j is indeed a man . 
(25) >.P>.i>.j.(i[v1]j I\ man(vd) I\ P(v1j)) . 
Note that i(v1]j is used here as abbreviation for the appropriate expression of 
typed logic that we will not bother to spell out . The translation of the common 
noun man in (25) does not involve states, and neither does the variable P that is 
proxy for the translation of the verb phrase. This is not quite right, for common 
nouns can contain relative clauses with dynamic effects, and verb phrases can 
have dynamic effects as well, so translations of common nouns and verb phrases 
must contain the means to accommodate these. In other words, the states must 
be 'threaded' through all these constituents. In case of a lexical noun such as 
man the net effect of the threading is nil, but the variable P must be of type 
(s, (s, (e , t))) to cater for state switches in the verb phrase . The translation for 
a1 man now looks like (26) . 
(26) >.P>.i>.k .:lj(i[v1]j I\ man(v1j) I\ P(vij, j, k)) . 
Here is the dynamic translation for A1 man loves a2 woman. 
(27) >.i>.k .:lj( i(v1]j I\ man( v1j) I\ j[v2]k I\ love ( v1 k, v2k) I\ woman( v2 k) ). 
The interpretation for the pronoun he1 makes use of the contents of store v1. 
Thus, the anaphoric links are provided by the retrieval of stored values. Expres-
sion (28) give the translation for the pronoun he1 that has the desired effect; P 
is again a variable of type (s, (s, (e, t))). 
(28) >.P>.i>.j.P(v1i,i,j) . 
The translation of the whole discourse (23) is left to the reader. A pioneer paper 
on dynamic interpretation of natural language is Barwise (1987) . Groenendijk & 
Stokhof (1990) and Muskens (1990) contain worked-out proposals. The article 
DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION also provides further information. 
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